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ON RECOVERY IN TORT FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSSt
Eileen Silverstein*
Pure economic loss is not considered a recoverable harm in tort law. Professor
Silverstein asks, "Why not?"
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the law, one discovers that similar consequences
are treated differently, depending on whether economic or physi-
cal integrity is implicated.' For example, getting something
valuable for next to nothing by paying subsistence wages to work-
ers is good business practice, while taking a television set from the
smashed window of a store is a crime;2 getting the deal you want by
threatening to kill your adversary's children is unlawfully coercive,
but pressuring a community to waive millions in taxes as a condi-
tion for not moving corporate operations to another state is skillful
negotiating; and getting money by pointing a gun at someone is
armed robbery, while it is a close question whether making a profit
by selling environmentally contaminated land as suitable for resi-
dential development to first-time home buyers may be illicit.
4
The question I wish to explore is the basis for distinguishing be-
tween these similar circumstances. Why, in the examples given
above, does use of physical coercion make getting something for
nothing, getting the deal you want, and getting money unlawful?
t Copyright © 1998 by Eileen Silverstein.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School. A.B. 1968, University of
Nebraska;J.D. 1972, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Howard Sacks, Alan
Ritter, and George Schatzki for comments on an earlier draft and to the University of Con-
necticut Law School Foundation for a research grant.
1. I use the term "integrity" to connote wholeness and security. Terminology is diffi-
cult, because some doctrines distinguish between economic and physical conduct and
others between economic and physical outcomes in evaluating legality.
2. See Richard Rothstein, Who Are The Real Looters , DISSENT, Fall 1992, at 429, 429-30
(comparing looters in Los Angeles with various corporate officers).
3. See Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 559
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that discussions ofjob creation and retention in connection
with solicitations for tax abatements are not promises but "hyperbole and puffery").
4. See Lindsey Gruson, 18 Suburban Homes: A Dream Undermined, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1993, at B1. Even where economic coercion is deemed criminal, as in cases of fraud, the
penalty for taking money in a financial transaction is significantly less than that for taking
money at gunpoint. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Des-
erts, 31 U. MICH.J.L. REFORm 289, 314 n.109 (1998).
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Another way to phrase the question is: What presuppositions about
economic and physical integrity does the law embody, and what
effects do these presuppositions have on legal outcomes?
The search for an answer begins with an examination of one of
tort law's oldest doctrines: Unintentional conduct that causes
physical harm to persons and property supports full compensation
to the injured party, including consequential damages for lost in-
come, property, and profits; but if the same conduct results in
economic harm unaccompanied by physical injury, there is no re-
covery despite the magnitude of the loss. 6 Thus, if negligent
maintenance of a utility transformer causes a telephone pole to lop
the chimney from a factory's roof, the utility must bear the costs of
repair; if the falling telephone pole separates a person's little fin-
ger from her left hand, the utility is liable for her medical
expenses, pain and suffering, and lost income. Indeed, if the
lopped off chimney costs the factory a few days of production, or if
the separated finger causally disables an investor from effecting a
FAX transmission authorizing a sale of stock worth $2 million,
both losses are recoverable because they are attendant on negli-
gently inflicted damage to person (the broken finger) or property
(the damaged chimney). But if, instead of amputating a finger or a
chimney, the downed telephone pole merely causes the interrup-
tion of a communication authorizing the stock transaction, the
investor, not the utility company, must bear the $2 million loss;
and if the damaged chimney causes the factory to suspend opera-
tions for a few days, while the utility is responsible to the factory
owner for repairs and lost profits, it is not responsible to the fac-
tory employees for lost wages, since the employees experienced no
7physical impairment of their property or persons.
5. In a series of essays on unrelated doctrines from tort, contract, criminal, employ-
ment, and labor law, I will examine how the question of legality differs depending on
whether physical or economic integrity is involved. I call these explorations essays, in Isaiah
Berlin's sense of the term: "an essay ... essays a subject, testing it, running it through an
exposition and objections .... Such essays do not prove cases. They explore subjects, in-
formally, sometimes playfully, and leave the reader to draw his own conclusions." Robert
Darnton, Free Spirit, N.Y. REv. BooKs,June 26, 1997, at 9, 9.
6. See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & New Haven Ry., 25 Conn. 265,
274-76 (1856) (denying recovery for economic loss in commercial transactions).
7. See, e.g., FMR Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 902, 903 (Mass. 1993)
(affirming no recovery for lost income and increased costs of doing business following
power outage); United Textile Workers of Am. v. Lear Siegler Seating Corp., 825 S.W.2d 83,
87 (Tenn. 1990) (denying recovery for employees' lost earnings following leak at industrial
park that caused one-day closing of neighboring facility). For the classic cases, see Connecti-
cut Mutua4 25 Conn. at 274-76, which allowed no recovery for economic loss in commercial
transactions, discussed infta notes 23-26, and Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200,
203 (Ohio 1946), which denied recovery of wages, discussed infra notes 47-52 and accom-
panying text.
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The intuitive explanation for excluding economic loss "only"
from tort liability is that physical injury is more serious than eco-
nomic injury.8 Recall the rhetorical demand, "your money or your
life," to which the answer-turning over the money-is "a fore-
gone certitude."9 But, as just described, a negligently maintained
utility pole causing a broken little finger supports damages, includ-
ing consequential loss of income or profits, while the same
negligent maintenance causing a failed FAX transmission and a
loss of $2 million results in absolutely no liability. Indeed, negli-
gently caused damage to property ranks higher than, and is
classified differently from, economic loss:' ° The factory owner's
losses from damage to the facility are compensable, whether $500
or $5 million, while the physically uninjured investor's $2 million
loss from the failed FAX transmission is not.
Judges and commentators, in explaining tort law's long-standing
reluctance to award damages for economic loss "only," acknowl-
edge that unrealized wages and- profits are harms, but they
emphasize the law's overriding concern with avoiding unlimited
liability for accidents associated with socially desirable activity."
8. See Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence:
A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 54 n.45 (1972) ("A number of the participants in
the London workshop also felt that the integrity of the body and the integrity of tangible
property are entitled to a higher priority in the scale of man's proper values than the integ-
rity of intangible wealth."). Other commentators draw a distinction between injuries to
persons and property when explaining the rule against recovery for pure economic loss. See
P.S. Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss, 83 LAw Q. Rav. 248, 269 (1967) ("It is hardly neces-
sary to labour the point that no form of personal injury can be truly compensated for in
money, and it is not surprising that the law affords much greater protection for personal
injury than for other forms of loss or injury."); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently
Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1513, 1532 (1985) [hereinafter
Rabin, A Reassessment] ("[I] t is undeniable that over the course of a century the courts have
come to attach particular significance to the problem of personal injury."); see also S.M.
Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that to treat a
breach of warranty "as an accident is to confuse disappointment [economic loss] with disas-
ter [physical injury]").
9. The phraseology is adapted from ARTHUR C. DANTO, AFrER THE END OF ART:
CONTEMPORARY ART AND THE PALE OF HISTORY 86 (1997).
10. But see infra text accompanying notes 89-94.
11. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1024-28 (5th Cir.
1985). Some might say that the doctrine's survival helps to prove its intrinsic rightness. The
tenacity of an idea, however, cannot be proof of its accuracy: Humans cannot fly unaided
like birds, superman's feats notwithstanding. The survival of the doctrine rejecting recovery
for pure economic loss must be explained rather than used as evidence of its own validity.
Nor is tenacity evidence of rightness in the sense of an efficient solution. Long-term adher-
ence to a rule suggests conforming business practice and predictability, but the argument is
circular. Long-term adherence to a competing rule would promote the same evidence of
custom and reliance: Pure economic loss, if recoverable in tort, would be a cost of doing
business taken into account in design, marketing, pricing, and insuring decisions.
Another explanatory candidate is that the rule aids nascent business development,
thought necessary in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and carried forward as
SPRING 1999]
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Thus, as Justice Cardozo warned, an investor who relied detrimen-
tally on an accounting firm's preparation of a certified balance
sheet for its client had no claim against the firm:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of
deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an inde-
terminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these
terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may
not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
12
consequences.
As expressed in contemporary policy terms by then-Judge
Breyer,13 "liability for pure financial harm, insofar as it proved vast,
cumulative and inherently unknowable in amount, could create
incentives that are perverse [if a goal of the tort system is to pro-
good policy despite the recent emphasis on incentives and risk spreading. See MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 13 (1992). This class-
based explanation has the virtue of bluntness; the law prefers business interests over indi-
vidual losses either because promoting economic development is good for society as a
whole or because the haves protect their own. One problem with such determinist thinking
is that the facts do not fit. During the same period that courts were rejecting claims of neg-
ligent interference with contracts because of their bank-busting potential, judges were
holding manufacturers responsible for injuries in the absence of privity or fault. See infra
text accompanying notes 36-41. Moreover, some of the early cases pitted one type of busi-
ness against another. While the class-based theory may explain the protection of an
entrepreneur over a worker, and of accountants (whose profession resembles that of law-
yers) over investors, how can we assert that the courts preferred the interests of builders
over printers, or of ship owners over time charterers? Undoubtedly in particular cases
judges reflected on the impact of liability rules on an immature industry, business, or pro-
fession, but the development of legal doctrines must accommodate overlapping demands.
See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537, 567 n.Il
(1972).
Finally, law and economics literature focuses on administrative concerns about multiple
lawsuits. See generally W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982);
MarioJ. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982). But
see Rabin, A Reassessment, supra note 8, at 1535 n.72; PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC
INTERESTS 471-72, 487-505 (1991).
12. The language isJustice Cardozo's in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444
(N.Y. 1931), discussed infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. The New York Court of
Appeals recently affirmed the Ultramares court's holding in Credit Alliance. Corp. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 114-15 (N.Y. 1985), while the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected the Ultramares holding in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 145-47 (N.J.
1983), discussed infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
13. See Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 1985). Judge
Breyer was joined by CircuitJudge Torruella and Senior CircuitJudge Rosenn of the Third
Circuit. See id.
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mote safe operations] . Accordingly, owners of a vessel that neg-
ligently spilled oil into Boston Harbor were not responsible for the
"significant" extra labor, fuel, transport, and docking expenditures
incurred by a nearby ship forced to alter its docking arrange-
ments.1 5
Fleming James, dubbing this the "pragmatic" objection to re-
covery for economic loss, generally concurs.' 6 Robert Rabin argues
that the tort system simply shuns widespread liability however in-
curred; thus, he groups economic loss along with emotional
distress and loss of consortium in the categories of harms for
which recovery has been limited expressly to control against liabil-
ity of indeterminate magnitude. 7 To the extent that Rabin and
others detect a softening in the long-standing resistance to recov-
ery for economic loss "only," it is solely (and in their view
appropriately so) in those cases featuring loss by identifiable indi-
viduals who were the intended beneficiaries of the defendant's
activity.
14. Id.Judge Breyer's scholarly opinion also notes the unknowable but predictable in-
creases in the number of claimants and in administrative costs that would burden the
litigation system, citing to the law and economics literature. See id. More recently, Justice
Breyer affirmed the liability limiting rationale underlying the no recovery rule in Saratoga
Fishing Co. v.JM. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 882 (1997), this time without citation to the
law and economics literature. To respondents' argument about imposing too great a liabil-
ity in tort, Justice Breyer answered for the majority: "[A] host of other tort principles, such
as foreseeability, proximate cause, and the 'economic loss' doctrine, already do, and would
continue to, limit liability in important ways." Id. at 884.
15. See Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 50. According to the district court opinion, the alleged
losses were $150,000. See Barbar Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 615 F. Supp. 109, 110 n.1
(D. Mass. 1984).
16. SeeJames, supra note 8, at 48-58. Consistent with his general preference for risk-
spreading, James cautions that the pragmatic objection to recovery for economic loss
should not apply in situations where the likelihood of widespread liability is minimal nor in
those circumstances where third-party insurance would be likelier and cheaper than first-
party insurance; however, these exceptions are of limited scope, and James seems to take
quite seriously the fear of unlimited liability as a reason to deny economic loss recovery in
general. On the use of insurability as a factor in deciding questions of liability, see CANE,
supra note 11, at 456-61.
17. See Rabin, A Reassessment, supra note 8, at 1514-15 ("It is my thesis that an identifi-
able type of economic loss case raises the specter of widespread tort liability--a characteristic
which in itself has never been uniquely confined to economic loss situations-and that
economic loss cases lacking this feature do not receive distinctive treatment." (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted)).
18. Rabin dubs this the "triangular configuration" and distinguishes the limited, in-
tended class of beneficiaries from a "general category of potential beneficiaries." Id. at
1527-28; accordW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129,
at 1002 (5th ed. 1984). But see Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise
Liability, 55 MD. L. REv. 1190, 1202-03 (1996) [hereinafter Rabin, Enterprise Liability].
There, Rabin discusses professional negligence cases as an example of broadened liability
premised on the ideology of enterprise responsibility for creating risks through the course
of ordinary business. See id.
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I propose a significantly different explanation of tort law's
treatment of recovery for stand-alone economic harm. Even
though many injuries are potential bank busters, stand-alone eco-
nomic injuries have been singled out for exemption from recovery
not because they are fundamentally different from injury to person
and property, but because of their similarity to outcomes in rou-
tine market transactions. That is, examination of the economic
harm from negligent conduct which involves no physical injury
leads one to think about and to make comparisons with economic
harm caused by market transactions. Consider three situations: (1)
In our hypothetical of the falling telephone pole, in the event of a
resulting broken finger, the law inquires in exquisite detail into
the level of care undertaken by the utility company in installing
and maintaining the transformer. (2) By comparison, if an investor
loses $2 million because a corporation's performance does not
meet her expectations, the law rarely asks why; and even if the loss
is directly attributable to high-level decision-making, such as the
marketing of a new product, the law never asks whether company
officials exercised reasonable care in deciding to launch the prod-
uct. (3) Now recall the hypothetical investor who is not physically
injured by the falling telephone pole but whose FAX transmission
is affected, with the resulting loss of $2 million. If no salient factors
distinguish (2) economic harm caused by the market from (3)
negligently caused economic loss, either both or neither should be
actionable. I suggest that if courts allow recovery for negligently
caused pure economic loss, it would be difficult to identify distin-
guishing, salient factors and to explicate why the market's form of
economic injury goes uncompensated. The requirement of (1)
some injury to person or property effectively eliminates the need to
consider the consequential anomalies and similarities of (2) and
(3). As I will argue, this explanation for the categorical refusal to
recognize an independent claim for economic loss fits the facts as
well as other accounts.
Parts I and II of this Essay do the easy work of demonstrating the
anomalous position of the economic loss rule in tort doctrine. Part
I traces the case law, drawing distinctions between fully compensa-
ble injuries resulting from physical harm to persons and property
and noncompensable injuries where the loss is solely economic.
Surprisingly, the century-old rationale for the categorical bar, the
specter of unbounded recovery, continues to be advanced virtually
The clear majority of jurisdictions require an identifiable, intended beneficiary. See infra
note 63. This approach is also recommended by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
552(2) (a) (1977); Atiyah, supra note 8, at 269-76; andJames, supra note 8, at 43-44.
[VOL. 32:3
On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss
unexamined despite reconsideration of most tort rules over the
last hundred years, despite the continual expansion of grounds for
liability, and despite the now commonplace awards of huge, un-
knowable sums in claims involving physical injuries. Part II
illustrates how contemporary principles of tort law could be ap-
plied to stand-alone economic injury, with causation and duty
undertaking their familiar job of limiting liability. 9 Finally, Part III
takes on the hard labor of explaining the remarkable vitality of the
unlimited liability rationale for the economic loss doctrine and of
challenging the intuitive assumption that interference with eco-
nomic integrity is not as significant as interference with physical
integrity.
I.
The origins of the categorical refusal to award tort damages for
pure economic loss are easily identified. Mid-nineteenth century
judges formulated rigid rules for deciding disputes and were cau-
tious about extending liability for accidental injuries. 20  As
Lawrence Friedman has pithily summarized it:
By the beginnings of the Gilded Age [1870], the general fea-
tures of the new tort law were crystal-clear. The leading
concepts-fault, assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
proximate cause-had been all firmly launched on their ca-
reers.... What they added up to was also crystal-clear.
Enterprise was favored over workers, slightly less so over pas-
sengers and members of the public. Juries were suspected-
on thin evidence-of lavishness in awarding damages; they
19. 1 am not suggesting that current applications of duty and causation are optimally
coherent or logical. The use of duty and causation to set boundaries on liability has the
same faults as other policy-generated doctrines. My point is rather that the liability for pure
economic loss can be managed, like liability for other harms, using the doctrines of duty
and causation. See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 37-38 (N.Y. 1985) (using
privity to cut off liability after a massive power failure in New York).
20. The rule against liability for negligently caused economic loss has its roots in the
early denial of claims for negligent interference with contract relations. See Charles E. Car-
penter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728, 737-42 (1928). Economic
injury from intentional interference with contract relations was remediable so long as the
interference was not justified. See generaUy Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and
Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 63-97
(1982) (discussing the state of the law and the proper scope of the interference tort). For a
critical evaluation, see ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL'OF
PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 55-94 (1952).
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had to be kept under firm control. The thrust of the rules,
taken as a whole, approached the position that corporate en-
terprise should be flatly immune from actions for personal
injury.2
Friedman hastens to add that this was not a conscious attempt or
conspiracy to cut liability: "[T] he spirit of the age was a spirit of
limits on recovery. People lived with calamity....
The germinal decision denying recovery for negligently caused
economic loss, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. New York &
New Haven Railway,3 perfectly exemplifies this mindset. The plain-
tiff held a $2,000 life insurance policy on a passenger who was
killed through defendant railway company's negligence. In deny-
ing the insurance company's claim for economic loss, the court
found no duty owed by the railway to the insurance company, an
unexceptional determination under then-existing doctrine. 4 Not
unlike other liability-limiting decisions at this time, 5 the court then
warned of the calamitous effect of holding otherwise:
Such are the complications of human affairs, so endless and
far-reaching the mutual promises of man to man, in business
and in matters of money and property, that rarely is a death
produced by a human agency, which does not affect the pe-
cuniary interest of those to whom the deceased was bound by
contract. To open the door of legal redress to wrongs re-
ceived through the mere voluntary and factitious relation of a
contractor with the immediate subject of the injury, would be
to encourage collusion and extravagant cantracts [sic] be-
tween men, by which the death of either through the
involuntary default of others, might be made a source of
splendid profits to the other, and would also invite a system of
21. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 475 (2d ed. 1985); see also
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943) ("Assumption of risk is a judicially
created rule which was developed.., to insulate the employer as much as possible from
bearing the 'human overhead' which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of the
doing of industrialized business. The general purpose ... seems to have been to give maxi-
mum freedom to expanding industry.").
22. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 470; cf HORWITZ, supra note 11, at 112 (making a
convincing case that judges consciously used the law to advance certain political and eco-
nomic interests).
23. 25 Conn. 265 (1856).
24. See id. at 273-77.
25. See, e.g., Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 211-13 (1866) (limiting liability
from negligently started fire to first destroyed building).
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litigation more portentious [sic] than our jurisprudence has
yet known.26
Thus, the categorical rule against recovery for pure economic loss
and its rationale fit nicely into the emerging jurisprudence of se-
verely circumscribed liability for accidental injuries.
As we know, however, the uncritical commitment to burgeoning
enterprise was quickly tempered, and over the last century, courts
and legislatures have consistently broadened the bases for liability.
In describing these developments, commentators often identify
three periods of ferment in tort law: The first shift ameliorated
some of tort doctrine's most enterprise-embracing elements; 17 the
second extended the bases for liability by allowing claims in the
absence of both privity of contract and fault;28 and the third re-
jected long-standing limitations on the types of injuries which
support recovery.& Interestingly, these shifts have had little impact
on the rule against recovery for pure economic loss.
Friedman, comparing the initial tort decisions of 1850 with
those of the late 1890s, traces the gradual easing of the doctrines
used to deny defendants' liability, such as assumption of risk,
proximate cause, fault, and contributory negligence. He states:
"Reaction to the severe rules made itself felt almost as soon as each
restrictive doctrine was born."30 Fear of excessive liability gave way
to impulses of "humane [ness].""' Equally, by the 1890s, the "rage
of the victims" carried significant political weight:
Change was clearly on the way. Insurance and risk-spreading
techniques were ready; cushions of capital reserves were
ready; most important, perhaps, an organized and restless
working class pressed against the law with voices and votes.
The rules of tort law, in twilight by 1900, were like some great
but transient beast, born, spawning and dying in the shortest
of time. The most stringent rules lasted, in their glory, two
generations at most.
3 2
The ameliorating spirit traced by Friedman had no impact on
the economic loss doctrine, however. For example, in the often
26. Connecticut Mutua4 25 Conn. at 274.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
28. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
30. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 476.
31. Id. at 485 (quoting Gary Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century
America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981)).
32. Id. at 475-76, 486-87.
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cited 1903 case of Byrd v. English,3 the owner of a printing plant
lost electrical power for several hours as a consequence of broken
wires caused by defendant's negligent excavation of a building
site. 4 In denying plaintiffs claim against the builder for economic
loss, the court opined:
If the plaintiff can recover of these defendants upon this
cause of action, then a customer of his, who was injured by
the delay occasioned by the stopping of his work, could also
recover from them, and one who had been damaged through
his delay could in turn hold them liable, and so on without
limit to the number of persons who might recover on account
of the injury done to the property of the company owning the
[wires]. To state such a proposition is to demonstrate its ab-
surdity.' 5
Perhaps because the harm in denying recovery for economic
loss could not be as dramatically illustrated as the harm in denying
recovery for a lost arm, the general loosening of tort's harshest
doctrines did not extend to the categorical refusal to recognize
pure economic loss. Perhaps most victims of economic loss them-
selves accepted the inevitability of their status and never
experienced or expressed their rage. Perhaps at the end of the
nineteenth century the consequences of physical injury appropri-
ately overshadowed the effects of pure economic loss.
Nonetheless, one is left wondering why the Byrd court, so crea-
tive in conjuring images of a single claim exploding into a
multitude of lawsuits, did not pause to address the consequences
of denying recovery to the single plaintiff who alone claimed that
the interruption of power caused provable damages with reason-
able certainty.
Beginning in 1916, a number of tort doctrines changed even
more dramatically. Restrictions on liability fell, largely in response
to the stunning ability of machines and modern working condi-
tions in the new era of mass production to cause devastating
injuries to people and property.36 Thus, the liability-limiting re-
quirement of privity of contract in order to sue a producer for
33. 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 420. The court also cited and quoted Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
New York & New Haven Railway, 25 Conn. 265 (1856), discussed supra notes 23-26 and ac-
companying text.
36. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 467.
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injury from a defective product s7 gave way to the rule imposing on
manufacturers a duty of care to workers, to consumers, and to
passersby, as well as to immediate purchasers.& A generation later,
the rigid insistence on fault as an indispensable predicate for tort
liability3 9 found exceptions first for physical injuries caused by in-
herently dangerous activities and products4° and then for harms to
persons and property sustained in using all sorts of goods.41 Tort
doctrine abandoned privity and fault as gatekeepers to recovery in
some circumstances because of the inability of injured parties to
protect themselves from the hazards of the modem world and be-
cause of the superior capacity of market participants to invest in
safety precautions and to internalize the costs of accidents. Put dif-
ferently, in some contexts the fearsome spectre of endless liability
to injured persons and property came to be viewed as a cost of do-
ing business, to be controlled not by categorical restrictions on
liability but by thoughtful (and sometimes arbitrary) application of
principles of causation and duty.
During this period, academic writers called attention to the
logical inconsistency between the rules denying pure economic
loss and the rules permitting consequential damages for economic
injury associated with personal and property damage, and they ar-
gued for reform.4 2 But a generation later these same writers
37. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842) (holding barred a
suit by an injured coachman against the maker of a defective wheel because of the absence
of privity: "if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the
road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action").
38. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916); see also East
River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986) (noting that the
manufacturer's duty includes protection against property damage). Rabin argues that the
threat of liability for multiple injuries arising from one negligent act was manageable as
long as the injuries were to persons but that fear of widespread liability for multiple injuries
to property remained strong and that the concept of duty did the work of privity doctrine in
containing liability. In support of his reading, Rabin cites the New York fire rule limiting
liability to the first building damaged by the negligently caused fire. See Rabin, A Reassess-
ment, supra note 8, at 1529-30. But as Rabin also notes, the New York rule was unique, see id.
at 1530 n.55, and damage to property generally supports an award of consequential eco-
nomic loss. On the similar treatment of injury to persons and property in British law, see
Atiyah, supra note 8, at 269.
39. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMESJR., THE COMMON LAW 94-96 (1881).
40. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, §§ 76-78 (discussing blasting, animal, and fire
cases).
41. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 152 (Cal. 1965) (Traynor, C.J.)
("Physical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is no reason for distin-
guishing them."), cited with approval in East River, 476 U.S. at 867. Justice Traynor's earlier,
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring), is the standard citation for the beginning of the movement to-
ward strict liability.
42. SeeJames, supra note 8, at 46-47.
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conceded the continuing asymmetry. Thus, in 1941, William
Prosser criticized the rule against recovery for foreseeable eco-
nomic injury and hesitatingly stated that "[t]here is some slight
authority looking rather vaguely in this direction, 43 only to con-
cede in 1971 that "lIt] here is actually, however, very little [case law]
looking even vaguely in this direction."" Fowler Harper, noting
authority to support a rule of liability for negligently inducing a
breach of contract or otherwise interfering with contract relations,
predicted in 1933 that "[u]ndoubtedly such a result is sound, and
it is likely to be followed in future cases,"45 only to report twenty
years later that "as a general rule, liability for negligent interfer-
ence with contractual relations does not exist."
46
The leading decision invoking the economic loss doctrine dur-
ing this period, Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co.,47 confirms the
continuing vitality of the economic loss doctrine and its rationale.
In Stevenson, the plaintiff was denied access to his workplace follow-
ing an explosion attributable to the negligence of East Ohio Gas,
which was storing natural gas at Stevenson's place of employ-
ment.4 Conscientiously citing earlier decisions and echoing their
speculations about the ripple effects of recognizing a claim for
modest, stand-alone economic injury to a single party, the court
first observed that if Stevenson stated a cause of action for lost
wages, then "each one of the thousands of workmen who lost
wages by reason of fire, negligently started,"49 would have eco-
nomic loss claims against the negligent tortfeasor. The court
further stated:
Cases might well occur where a manufacturer would be
obliged to close down his factory because of the inability of
43. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 993 (lst ed. 1941).
44. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 940 (4th ed. 1971).
45. FOWLER V. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 477-78 (1933).
46. Fowler V. Harper, Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 873, 892
(1953). A similar pattern appeared in the jurisprudence of products liability. The California
and NewJersey Supreme Courts reached contrary conclusions in 1965 about the recovery of
economic loss for defective products. Compare Seely, 403 P.2d at 151-52 (no recovery), with
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 313-14 (N.J. 1965) (allowing recovery).
Twenty years later the New Jersey Supreme Court, responding to the icy reception of fed-
eral and state courts, fell in with the majority view and held that a commercial buyer could
not sue in products liability for its economic loss. See Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663 (N.J. 1985). The Seely-Santor debate is ably dissected in Gary T.
Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples ofJ'Aire and of Products Liability,
23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 37, 51-78 (1986).
47. 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
48. See id. at 201.
49. Id.
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his supplier due to a fire loss to make prompt deliveries; the
power company with a contract to supply a factory with elec-
tricity would be deprived of the profit which it would have
made if the operation of the factory had not been interrupted
by reason of fire damage; a man who had a contract to paint a
building may not be able to proceed with his work; a salesman
who would have sold the products of the factory may be de-
prived of his commissions; the neighborhood restaurant
which relies on the trade of the factory employees may suffer
a substantial loss. The claims of workmen for loss of wages
who were employed in such a factory and cannot continue to
work there because of a fire, represent only a small fraction of
the claims which would arise if recovery is allowed in this class
of cases.5
Of course, as the court noted, research revealed no such cata-
strophic claims,5 ' perhaps because of causation difficulties. But the
parade of imagined horribles meant that the East Ohio Gas Com-
pany did not have to pay Mr. Stevenson $105.60, representing
eight days of lost wages. And concerns about asymmetrical reme-
dies remained buried in law review articles and treatises.
One line of cases allowing recovery for pure economic loss did
appear during this period, but it was quickly limited, serving only
to highlight the resistance to unifying remedial standards for the
consequences of negligent conduct. Negligent statements resulting
in economic loss "only" became actionable as long as the claimant
was the intended beneficiary, as compared to one of a general class
of potential beneficiaries, of the statements. Two decisions by
Justice Cardozo illustrate this point. In the 1922 case of Glanzer v.
Shepard,5 3 weighers under contract to the seller carelessly
misrepresented the weight of beans to the buyer and were held
liable for the amount overpaid by the buyer. 4 Cardozo found that
the weighers, who, of course, had no contractual relationship with
the buyer, nevertheless owed a duty of care to the buyer because
"acting, not casually nor as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an
independent calling [they] weighed and certified at the order of
one with the very end and aim of shaping the conduct of
50. Id. at 203-04.
51. See id. at 201.
52. See id. at 201, 204. Similarly, Justice Cardozo employed dire language in Ultramares,
174 N.E. at 444, a lawsuit that involved a single investor who repeatedly relied on negligent
misrepresentations. See supra note 12 and infra note 58 and accompanying text.
53. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
54. See id. at 275.
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another." 5 By contrast, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,56 decided in
1931, an accounting firm engaged to supply its client with an
original plus thirty-two copies of a certified balance sheet was not
liable for the losses of an investor who received and relied on one
of the duplicates of the negligently prepared balance sheet.
57
Glanzer may be distinguished from the general rule as a case in
which the limit of liability was the value of the goods, as compared
to the unknown number of persons who could claim reliance on
the accounting firm's misrepresentation, the often quoted consid-
eration being to avoid "liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 8 On the Ultramares
facts, however, the claim of indeterminacy appears weak: The ac-
counting firm delivered an original plus thirty-two copies; the
plaintiff authorized repeated loans over a six to nine month period
allegedly on the strength of the faulty financial statement; and no
other similarly situated investors are identified in the opinion.' 9
The limit of liability in Ultramares appears, therefore, both know-
able and determinate. 0
Glanzer may also be distinguished as a case in which the benefi-
ciary of the service rendered was the third person, while in
Ultramares the primary beneficary of the information was the cor-
poration itself, not the lenders. 6' As Warren Seavey observes,
however, this is a distinction without a difference:
It is reasonably obvious that the weight card in the former
case [ Glanzer] was for the benefit of the seller as well as for
the benefit of the buyer, and that in the latter case
[Ultramares] the duplicate originals were intended for the
benefit of third persons as well as for the client.62
Writing fifty years later, however, Robert Rabin asserts that Glan-
zer and Ultramares continue to demarcate the appropriate line
55. Id. at 277.
56. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
57. See id. at 442.
58. Id. at 444. But cf MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916)
(Cardozo,J.) (abandoning the privity doctrine).
59. See Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 442-43.
60. Cardozo did allow the claim of fraud to go forward in Ultramares. See id. at 447-49.
It may be that Cardozo's invocation of an indeterminate class referred to an unexpressed
fear that the class of potential investors relying on any accounting firm's certification might
have greatly exceeded 32 persons, a reasonable fear in light of the extensive stock market
activity preceding the 1929 crash.
61. See Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 20,
48 (1939).
62. Id. at 48.
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between recoverable and unrecoverable stand-alone economic
loss. 63 He reasons that the intended beneficiary criterion keeps li-
ability to manageable levels, in the same way that the physical
injury requirement appropriately circumscribes liability for conse-
quential economic damages: In both types of cases the potential
number of claimants has a "natural" limit.
This natural limit approach is vulnerable on two grounds. First,
as we have seen, the early cases involve small, determinate claims
whose particulars were less important than the general fear of un-
bounded liability arising from any expansion of tort doctrine.64
Continued reliance on the specter of limitless recovery based on
nothing but speculation betrays the rationale's poverty in an era of
judicial opinions characterized by a commitment to logic, consis-
tency, and context. Nor is financial exposure for physical harm as
determinate as the theory of containing liability assumes. For ex-
ample, there is simply no limit on potential damage awards for
mass torts like improperly produced, tested, marketed, or im-
planted asbestos, cigarettes, silicon breast enhancers, or birth
control devices.65 These and other examples of liability involving
indeterminate amounts for an indeterminate time to an indeter-
minate class are now familiar.66 The proportionality concern that is
61
one element of the issue of unbounded liability is similarly dated.
To take but two examples: "Mere" negligence now supports awards
for mental distress suffered by the deceased before dying, as in
63. See Rabin, A Reassessment, supra note 8, at 1527-28. But cf. Rabin, Enterprise Liability,
supra note 18, at 1202-03 (recognizing that some courts go beyond the triangular relation-
ship in allowing recovery for pure economic loss). The Restatement (Second) of Torts retains
the requirement of intended beneficiary but extends liability to a known and intended class
of beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). The majority of juris-
dictions follow Ultramares. Cf Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 55 (1st
Cir. 1985). But see Peter Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liability for Economic Loss in Tort Law,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 427, 447 (David G. Owen ed., 1995)
(claiming that the unstated but true distinction in these cases is between liability for misfea-
sance and nonliability for nonfeasance).
64. See Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New York & New Haven Ry., 25 Conn. 265
(1856), discussed supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text; Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga.
1903), discussed supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
65. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. R~v. 961, 1040-42 (1993) (discussing the vari-
ous damage awards and indicating that the possibility of receiving punitive awards has
stimulated the surge in this type of lawsuit).
66. Compare Rabin, A Reassessment, supra note 8, at 1515 n.6 (suggesting that multiple
claims from a wrongful course of conduct raise different issues than multiple claims from a
single tortious act), with CANE, supra note 11, at 472-73 (disagreeing).
67. For a philosophical analysis of why disproportionate consequences are a part of
the tort system, see Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw, supra note 63, at 387.
SPRING 1999]
Univeiy of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Cook v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co.,6 8 where the Court upheld an
award of $35,000 for pain and suffering for the 2.5 minutes the
deceased was alive before drowning;69 and imposition of liability on
social hosts for negligently inflicted injuries on third parties by
drunk guests may not be considered disproportionate to the hosts'
70negligence in continuing to serve alcohol to those guests. It may
be, as James cautions, that the economies of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries could not accommodate the magnitude
of losses that are viewed as routine in the late twentieth century.7'
But whether the specter of financial ruin from recognizing mod-
est, individual actions for economic loss was realistic or
exaggerated at the time, that fear has little to tell us today about
the reason for distinguishing economic from physical loss.
72
Second, and of equal importance to understanding why the tra-
ditional story is misleading, tort doctrine is once again loosening
the limits on recovery in various areas by reconfiguring the con-
cepts of duty and causation, but stand-alone economic loss persists
as a largely noncompensable harm.3
Perhaps the most dramatic recent change in tort doctrine is
elimination of the "physical impact" rule, which held that persons
frightened but not physically harmed by negligent conduct could
not recover damages for resulting emotional distress, no matter
how severe.14 The long-standing "physical impact" requirement was
explained as a way to insure the legitimacy of claims in fright cases
68. 626 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1980).
69. See id. at 747-48; see also McAleer v. Smith, 791 F. Supp. 923 (D.R.I. 1992)
(uphoilding claims for conscious pain and suffering before death by drowning); Capelouto
v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 500 P.2d 880, 885 (Cal. 1972) (finding that a jury may infer pain
based on its common experience that pain accompanies the type of injury).
70. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1220 (N.J. 1984).
71. SeeJames, supra note 8, at 49. James attributes the failed campaign, in part, to the
inherent correctness of limiting losses to manageable levels and the potential for stand-
alone economic recovery to reach unacceptably high amounts. See id. at 47. For an illumi-
nating discussion of contemporary strategies for dealing with liability, see Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14-38 (1996).
72. Cf Koenig & Rustad, supra note 4, at 339-42 (discussing the use of million dollar
punitive damage awards as a deterrent).
73. This may be another revolution in conceptualizing tort principles, but as with pre-
vious revolutions, the conceptual shift may prove more influential among legal
commentators in law reviews than in case law. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the
Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 653-56 (1992)
(tracing judicial disillusion with strict products liability). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (restating products liability in a single section), with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) (devoting an entire Restatement to products
liability). The drafting process is described in David Owen, Essay, Products Liability Law Re-
stated, 49 S.C. L. REv. 273, 278-287 (1998).
74. Emotional distress includes fright, grief, humiliation, and embarrassment. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt.j (1965).
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and to limit the potential scope of liability.75 On the other hand,
once negligently caused physical impact was established, the plain-
tiff could recover for emotional distress (and economic loss) as
parasitic damages; arguably the nature and extent of the physical
injury would set appropriate boundaries for the claims of pain and
suffering.16 Responding to criticism that the impact rule arbitrarily
singled out compensable from noncompensable injuries77 and rely-
ing on contemporary understandings of psychic pain 78 and on
greater faith in the medical judgment of mental health profession-
als, 79 beginning in 1968, most jurisdictions abandoned the physical
impact requirement." Thus, court decisions now talk about a duty
to avoid creation of an unreasonable risk of physical harm, thereby
allowing an independent tort for negligently caused emotional dis-
tress by persons frightened but not physically injured;8' and judges
75. See, e.g., Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263, 266-67 (Pa. 1958) (describing the Pan-
dora's box of false claims if the physical impact rule is eliminated). Justice Musmanno's
colorful dissent is worth a look. See id. at 267-80 (Musmanno,J., dissenting).
76. See id. But see P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 213 (3rd ed.
1980) ("There appears to be simply no way of working out any relationship between the
value of money-what it will buy-and damages awarded for pain and suffering, and dis-
abilities."); Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d 673, 681 (Cal. 1966)("Every case which has
considered the issue [of pain and suffering] ... has emphasized the difficulty faced by ajury
in attempting to measure in monetary terms compensation for injuries as subjective as
pain.... ."). It is estimated that over 60 percent of automobile liability payments in the
United States are attributable to non-pecuniary damages. See Bruce Chapman & Michael J.
Trebilcock, Making Hard Social Choices: Lessons from the Auto Accident Compensation Debate, 44
RUTGERS L. REV. 797, 815-16 (1992).
77. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1980) (finding
physical injury requirement overinclusive because it allows recovery even though physical
injury is trivial and underinclusive because it denies plaintiffs an opportunity to prove the
validity of a claim at trial).
78. See Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA.
L. REv. 333, 402-03 (1984).
79. See Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20 (Haw. 1970).
80. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (providing standard authority for
rejecting the physical impact requirement); Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negli-
gent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "the Punishment Fit the Crime", 1 U. HAW. L. REv. 1,
3 (1979) (stating that the impact rule does not have widespread support). But cf Metro-
North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 430, 439-40 (1997) (holding that a
worker exposed to asbestos for three years on the job and who feared but had no physical
sign of asbestos-related cancer could not maintain causes of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress or for future medical expenses under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA)). For a state-by-state analysis of the physical impact requirement, see Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544-49 (1994).
81. This is the "zone of danger" test. A good discussion of the policy reasons for limit-
ing emotional distress claims to those within the zone of danger of physical injury can be
found in Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 549-57. The Gottshall court adopted the zone of danger test
for FELA and expressly rejected a broader standard that would have permitted recovery for
negligently inflicted emotional distress when, in the words of the Court of Appeals below,
"the factual circumstances.., provide a threshold assurance that there is a likelihood of
genuine and serious emotional injury." Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355,
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regard bystanders who suffer emotional distress from witnessing
negligent injury to a loved one as "foreseeable plaintiffs."8 2 To nar-
row the classes of direct and bystander parties who may sue for
emotional distress, courts impose evidentiary requirements such as
severe psychic trauma, 3 contemporaneous observation of the neg-
ligent act and its consequences, 4 an intimate family relation
between the physically and the emotionally injured parties, sor a
pre-existing contractual or fiduciary relationship between patient
and physician. 6 As with the abandonment of privity and the adop-
tion of strict liability for harm caused by defective products, a
mechanical no recovery rule has changed in just over ten years 7 to
a system in which changing conceptions of duty and causation do
the work of limiting liability.s
371 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 430-32 (no FELA claim for on-the-job
exposure to asbestos in the absence of a physical manifestation of illness).
82. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968) (holding that a mother who wit-
nessed death of infant by negligent motorist may state a claim for emotional distress even
though she was not physically at risk).
83. See Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520 (finding that concerns about the genuineness of
claims and unlimited liability could be addressed by a jury applying the standard of severe
or serious mental distress and through the application of tort law's general principle of
foreseeability).
84. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 921.
85. Jurisdictions differ as to whether the negligent conduct must be directed toward a
member of one's nuclear family and whether contemporaneous observation of the conduct,
of the accident, and of its physical consequences are required. SeeJ. Mark Appleberry, Negli-
gent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Focus on Relationships, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 309-312
(1995) (summarizing recent cases).
86. See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 205 (Alaska 1995) (holding that emo-
tional distress resulting from a misdiagnosis of AIDS is foreseeable and serious). Emotional
distress from harm to real or personal property may also be recoverable. See Bode v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 786 F.2d 669, 672 (5th Cir. 1986) (damage resulting from an air-
line crash); Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520 (flood damage to home); Moorehead v. State Dep't of
Highways, 353 So. 2d 1103, 1105 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (removal of trees and exposure of
roots on residential lawn). But see HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-8.9 (Michie 1995)
(restricting plaintiffs suing for emotional distress arising from damage to property to prove
attendant physical injury or mental illness); cf Zeigler v. F St. Corp., 235 A.2d 703, 705 (Md.
1967) (allowing no recovery for mental distress resulting from flooding of land); Buchanan
v. Stout, 108 N.Y.S. 38, 39 (1908) (finding no recovery for mental distress resulting from the
death of the plaintiff's cat).
87. See Miller, supra note 80, at 3.
88. Other areas in which traditional limitations on duty have been relaxed include a
therapist's failure to warn an identified victim of death threats communicated by the thera-
pist's patient, see Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976); Rabin,
Enterprise Liability, supra note 8, at 1200 n.64, and employment-related injury from negligent
misrepresentations or negligent infliction of emotional distress, see infra text accompanying
notes 89-94. But see Leslie Benton Sandor & Carol Berry, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 1247, 1269-77
(1995) (criticizing courts for refusing emotional distress damages attendant on pure eco-
nomic loss).
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In an equally dramatic decision, the Montana Supreme Court
recently abolished the distinction between negligent and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, establishing infliction of
emotional distress as a single, independent cause of action.89 Gen-
erally, in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
plaintiff is required to establish the outrageousness of the defen-
dant's behavior, presumably to guard against specious claims of
crippling emotional distress arising from merely nasty conduct.9
But, as the Montana court pointed out, there were no reported
cases in which a plaintiff had prevailed on a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress,91 suggesting that the gate-keeping
function of the outrageousness element may have turned into a
claim-barring device. To address concerns about a floodgate of
claims and unlimited liability, the court chose to rely on the plain-
tiff's obligation to prove serious or severe emotional distress and
stated that such distress was a "reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the defendant's negligent act or omission."9' Although the dis-
pute in Sacco v. High Country Independent Press, Inc. 93 arose over the
defendants' comments and actions after the plaintiff left their em-
ployment, the court explicitly identified personal, property, and
legal interests as covered by the new cause of action when conduct
results in severe or serious emotional distress.94
In both the fright and distress causes of action, negligent con-
duct inflicts an emotional, not physical,95  harm, but the
In a related development, Rabin observes the "more robust principle of fault" in medical
malpractice cases, noting abandonment of the same locality rule, expansive use of res ipsa
loquitur, less restrictive standards for qualifying experts, and ease in establishing the ab-
sence of informed consent. See Rabin, Enterprise Liability, supra note 8, at 1200-01.
In environmental disputes, damages for the loss of nature may be added to commercial
losses. See generally Alan Strudler, Valuing Nature: Assessing Damages for Oil Spills, REP. FROM
INST. FOR PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1995, at 6.
89. See Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411,427-29 (Mont. 1995).
90. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1, 6, 15-18 (1988) (discussing cases and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
91. See Sacco, 896 P.2d at 427. The failure to discover successful causes of action in
economic loss cases often leads to the opposite conclusion, viz. that the categorical refusal is
sensible. See, e.g., Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio 1946), discussed
supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text;James, supra note 8.
92. Sacco, 896 P.2d at 425.
93. 896 P.2d 411 (Mont. 1995). The Montana Court relied heavily on the reasoning in
the Hawaii Supreme Court's opinion in Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 518-21 (Haw.
1970).
94. The definition of severe or serious emotional distress is found in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt.j (1965). The Supreme Court of Montana reaffirmed Sacco in
Treichel v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 930 P.2d 661, 665 (Mont. 1997).
95. Unlike the Montana Supreme Court, most courts faced with wrongful discharge
lawsuits alleging negligent misrepresentation or negligent infliction of emotional distress
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consequences experienced by the plaintiffs are sufficiently similar
to those resulting from physical injury to justify a remedy, and con-
temporary courts expect notions of duty and causation to rein in
tendencies towards frivolous claims or ruinous liability. In contrast,
when it comes to stand-alone economic injury, most courts and
commentators cling to the rhetoric of preventing widespread li-
ability and affirm the reasonableness of a general bar to recovery;
among others, James and Rabin insist that the concern about wide-
spread liability is empirically96 and morally97 sound. Part II
challenges this orthodoxy by using contemporary notions of duty
and causation to analyze claims of pure economic loss.
II.
A favorite illustration of the need to limit liability by not com-
pensating pure economic injury is Judge Kaufman's 1968
hypothetical of the unlucky motorist whose inadvertence causes an
accident that shuts down the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel during rush
hour:9 s
A driver who negligently caused such an accident would cer-
tainly be held accountable to those physically injured in the
crash. But we doubt that damages would be recoverable
against the negligent driver in favor of truckers or contract
carriers who suffered provable losses because of the delay or
to the wage earner who was forced to "clock in" an hour late.
And yet it was surely foreseeable that among the many
fail to address the doctrinal limits on recovery for emotional harm unaccompanied by con-
temporaneous physical injury. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 90, at 8-12 (discussing traditional
employment cases). The courts struggle with whether to recognize a right for negligent
misrepresentation or distress in the employment context, seemingly oblivious to the fact
that the remedy for such a violation involves the traditionally rejected award of damages for
economic loss "only." See id.
96. SeeJames, supra note 8, at 51.
97. See Rabin, A Reassessment, supra note 8, at 1534 (asserting that proportionality is a
consistent feature of the tort system). But see CANE, supra note 11, at 473 (asserting that in
tort, there are no degrees of legal fault); Waldron, supra note 67 (comparing the potential
liability of equally negligent actors, only one of whom causes a harm).
98. See Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Kinsman I1).
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[thousands] who would be delayed would be truckers and
99
wage earners.
Many readers may find themselves mentally nodding in agree-
ment with Judge Kaufman. As described, liability to thousands,
none of whom suffered physical injury, for mere inadvertence may
look disproportionate, perhaps ruinous. But let us investigate this
intuitive response. First, as compared to awards for pain and suffer-
ing, the loss from economic injury is provable, not subjective or
speculative.100 And even if delay costs 3000 motorists an average of
$500 each (a generous assumption), the negligent driver's liability
looks to be about $1.5 million, a significant sum, but hardly pau-
perizing in a world of multi-million dollar awards to one or two
parties seriously injured in traffic accidents. 101 Also noteworthy is
the grouping of truckers and contract carriers with wage earners as
equally undeserving claimants. The truckers and contract carriers
are likely to be insured against losses occasioned by delays, whereas
wage earners will not be. Perhaps eligibility for economic loss
should exclude professional drivers and carriers in the course of
their business, just as public safety officials cannot recover for neg-
ligently caused physical harm incurred while performing their
jobs. 102 But why exempt the wage-earners?' 3 Even more curious is
the absence of any specific reference in the hypothetical to liability
99. Id. Positive references can be found in Barber Lines A/S v. M,/VDonau Maru, 764
F.2d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1985), and Rabin, A Reassessment, supra note 8, at 1525 n.39, 1536 n.73.
See also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 234 (1997) ("The
reason [there is very little deviation away from the rule denying recovery for pure economic
injury] is that the considerations that supported the rule a century ago still largely support
it."); JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 155 (1995)
("[I]t is clear that liability is denied because of the burden such losses would impose, not
because secondary economic losses are unforeseeable."); Schwartz, supra note 46, at 59
n.120 (explaining that only the product owner will be harmed by economic loss because
any other party suffering economic loss may be "tantamount to a bystander" and unable to
recover the loss).
100. For an examination of the disparity between awards for physical injury and conse-
quential damages, see Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
"Pain and Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. REy. 908 (1989).
101. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 65, at 1040-42.
102. See, e.g., Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Comm'n, 649 N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (N.Y.
1995) (holding police and fire fighters barred from recovery where performance of duty
increased the risk of injury).
103. Even if one of the wage earners is a highly compensated executive whose damages
far exceed the hypothetical average, this should make no difference to the analysis. Tort
doctrine generally requires the defendant to take her victim as she finds her for purposes of
measuring damages after liability has been established. See Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421
F.2d 1169, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970). Once again, a comparison to consequential economic loss is
apt: breaking the arm of a concert violinist and breaking the arm of a retired librarian each
trigger liability, although for vastly different sums of money.
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for property damage occasioned by the accident, the appropriately
compensated being "those physically injured." Certainly the car
owner whose automobile, though not involved in the primary ac-
cident, suffers $5000 damages attributable to the negligently
caused crash will receive compensation for repairs and consequent
economic harm. Similarly, if the negligent motorist caused minor
physical damage to 3000 vehicles, delaying each driver an hour, in
principle all drivers could recover for their proven economic losses
as consequential damages from injury to their property.0 4 Why
should the fortuity of minor harm to property entitle these drivers
to recover for economic loss? And what if two tennis stars on their
way to compete in the United States Open are involved in this auto
accident, one athlete suffering a minor wrist sprain while the other
endures only a delay that results in a forfeited match? For both
tennis players, the consequences that matter are identical; athletes
with a chance at titles are denied a singular opportunity to prove
themselves, losing rankings, prize money, and endorsements. But
only the athlete with the sprained wrist has a compensable injury
and the opportunity to claim consequential economic damages.
On the other hand, viewed through the lens of pragmatism, how
likely is it that many wage earners docked one hour's pay (or a
class of wage earners) will engage lawyers to recover the lost earn-
ings from the negligent driver? When the unusual claim for pure
economic loss occurs, ought not the courts face the question of
when "the link has become too tenuous-that what is claimed to
be consequence is only fortuity"?10 5 And the hypothetical ignores
third-party insurance and the benefit of spreading the risk among
104. The absence of any reference to property damage in the hypothetical is even more
startling when one compares Kaufman's observation. in note seven of the opinion that
"where there is physical damage to a vessel the owner can recover for the loss of its use until
repairs are completed." Kinsman II, 388 F.2d at 825 n.7. Perhaps Judge Kaufman's silence
on the right to damages for harm to property reflects his unexpressed recognition that
property damage is, in effect, economic loss. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
105. Kinsman II, 388 F.2d at 825. Judge Kaufman refuses to use the negligent interfer-
ence with contract doctrine upon which the district court relied and instead opts for "more
familiar tort terrain," id. at 824, that is, "the circumlocution whether posed in terms of
'forseeability,' 'duty,' 'proximate cause,' 'remoteness,' etc .... " Id. at 825. It is one of the
ironies of this opinion that, in analyzing the case under this "more familiar tort terrain,"
Kaufman explicitly rejects the proportionality and floodgates arguments as reasons for rely-
ing instead on interference with contract. See id. at 823-24.
According to Judge Kaufman, "Here, as elsewhere, the answer must be that courts have
some expertise in performing their almost daily task of distinguishing the honest from the
collusive or fraudulent claim. And, 'if the result is out of all proportion to the defendant's
fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiff's entire innocence."' Id. at 823
(quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 964 (3d ed. 1964)). Of
course, Kaufman then poses the widely-cited hypothetical under discussion in note eight of
the opinion. See id. at 825 n.8; discussion supra note 99.
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motorists, any one of whom could be the careless injurer or the
unlucky injured.'0 6 Thus, on close analysis the intuitive appeal of
categorical denial of recovery for pure economic loss in order to
forestall unacceptably widespread liability disappears. There may
be instances of potentially ruinous liability but those instances do
not serve as the foundation for the general rule prohibiting recov-
ery for economic loss.
Let us imagine for a moment a highly improbable legal regime
in which the question of liability in .tort for causing pure economic
injury had never been addressed or even hypothesized; but the
tunnel accident imagined by Judge Kaufman occurs, and claims for
pure economic loss arise in a case of first impression. The tort of
negligence is commonly said to have four elements: (1) unreason-
able conduct, (2) causation, (3) duty, and (4) harm. In the tunnel
accident, the negligent driving caused an accident, resulting in
physical injury to some but in delay without physical harm to thou-
sands of others. And Judge Kaufman concedes that the plaintiffs,
the economic harm, and the delay are foreseeable. Thus, the out-
standing question appears to be whether the negligent driver owed
a duty to the thousands of persons delayed and economically in-
jured. On what sources would a court rely in determining the
question of duty? We have stipulated that there are no precedents
directly on point, but perhaps guidance will be found in discus-
sions from recent case law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
treatises, or law reviews.
As every first-year law student learns, the question of whether a
relation exists between individuals which imposes upon one a legal
obligation for the benefit of the other is not-capable of being an-
swered in the abstract.0 7 Prosser tells us that "as our ideas of
human relations change the law as to duties changes with them"
and that "[n] o better general statement can be made than that the
courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable persons would
recognize it and agree that it exists."' 8 But he goes on to identify
factors commonly used by courts in finding a duty:
106. Curiously, when insurance is considered, authors indulge in inconsistent assump-
tions about the identity and insurance practices of various parties, often, it seems, to assert
the likelihood of spreading risks and costs appropriately. See, e.g.,J.A. Smillie, Negligence and
Economic Loss, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 231, 237-39 (1982). But see CANE, supra note 11, at 502
(criticizing Smillie). On the role of insurance in general in tort cases involving economic
interests, see id. at 431-61.
107. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, § 53.
108. Id. § 53, at 359.
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(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
(2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff was
harmed,
(3) the closeness of the connection between defen-
dant's conduct and plaintiff's harm,
(4) the extent of moral blame attached to the defen-
dant's conduct,
(5) the policy of preventing future harm,
(6) the burden on the defendant and impact on the
community of imposing a duty, and
(7) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for
the risk involved.'09
Not surprisingly, we have already established some of these fac-
tors in the preceding paragraph: (1) Foreseeability: automobile
accidents during heavy traffic cause injury to persons and property
and delay for many drivers; (2) Certainty of Harm: the economic
consequences of delay are readily ascertainable and verifiable; and
(3) Causation: in the hypothetical there is no question that the
negligent conduct is responsible for the delays and there are no
intervening events. It is difficult to assess the role of (4) Moral
Blameworthiness in our analysis of duty. Arguably, once we have
identified the negligent act or omission, the inquiry into moral
blameworthiness is over. Indeed, as Peter Cane has noted:
[V] ery large amounts of damages can be payable for personal
injuries and property damage as a result of disasters such as ex-
plosions in chemical factories or on marine oil platforms; but
no one suggests that the damages payable should be limited
because they might be out of proportion to the degree of
fault involved. On the contrary, the degree of (moral) fault
seems to be judged according to the size of the injury in-
flicted, regardless of the nature of the tortious conduct." °
Yet some commentators continue to insist that proportionality
must limit liability in the context of economic losses."' Perhaps the
degree of moral blameworthiness adds weight when the other fac-
tors point decidedly in one direction but do not alter the
calculation. Deterrence, (5) and (6), is as malleable a concept as
109. Id. § 53, at 359 n.24.
110. CANE, supra note 11, at 473 (emphasis in original).
111. See Rabin, A Reassessment, supra note 8, at 1534-36; Rabin, Enterprise Liability, supra
note 18, at 1202-03.
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moral blameworthiness. We can say, on the one hand, that full re-
alization of the scope of potential damages will reinforce one's
desire to drive carefully; on the other hand, negligence is by defi-
nition inadvertence and one victim with an eggshell skull may
experience far more significant damage than thousands of victims
with minor injuries. The deterrence calculation might also take
into account the cost and annoyance associated with filing and liti-
gating a legal claim; careless drivers might gamble that only those
with a very large (pure) economic loss will bother to make a claim
and that such claimants are rare. The inquiry regarding the avail-
ability and effect of (7) Insurance is largely a. canard.1 1 2 Insurance
coverage follows liability rules," 3 and a rule making pure economic
loss recoverable in tort could easily be accommodated through
third- or first-party insurance.1 4 It is, therefore, very much an open
question whether a court faced with the tunnel accident as a case
of first impression in 1999 would hold the negligent driver to have
a duty to those suffering pure economic loss.
The reasonableness of the concern about unknowable, cata-
strophic liability and the fairness of the no recovery rule can be
further tested by looking at the few cases in which courts have re-
jected the categorical prohibition and subjected recovery for pure
economic loss to the reconfigured concepts of duty and causation
that are broadening liability elsewhere.
The New Jersey Supreme Court undertook a thorough consid-
eration of duty and causation in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,"5 a
1983 case which once again raised the question of auditors' liabil-
ity for the financial losses of third parties. Rejecting the Ultramares
restriction of liability to intended beneficiaries only and the Re-
statement's limitation to a known and intended class of
beneficiaries, the court held auditors liable to persons whom the
auditors should reasonably have foreseen would be given and
would rely upon the audit."6 The court noted the expertise and
independence of professional accountants who perform audits"7
and tort law's repudiation of privity.1" More importantly, however,
112. SeeCANE, supra note 11, at445-46.
113. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1225 (NJ. 1984) (observing that homeown-
ers' insurance policies will cover host liability for drunken guests' subsequent negligent
auto accident).
114. See LoPucki, supra note 71, at 72-75 (describing insurance instruments).
115. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
116. See id. at 153.
117. See id. at 150.
118. See id. at 145-46. The NewJersey Court relied, in part, on an earlier decision hold-
ing manufacturers liable for economic losses occasioned in connection with products
liability. See Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 207 A.2d 305, 310-11(NJ. 1965). The court
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the court discredited the reasonableness of "the spectre of finan-
cial catastrophe"" 9 by examining the liability question in light of
developments outside and within tort law. Thus, the court pointed
out that purchasers of securities in public offerings already have a
claim against accounting firms for misstatement of a material fact
in financial statements; 120 that independent auditors have been
able to obtain liability insurance covering these risks and that
there is no reason to believe they could not purchase malpractice
insurance to cover negligent acts leading to detrimental reliance
by persons who receive the audit from a company pursuant to a
proper business purpose; 2 1 that imposition of a duty may promote
more careful reviews, arguably leading to fewer mistakes; 122 that the
costs of increased diligence will be borne by the insurer or its cus-
tomers;123 that the extent of financial exposure has built-in limits,
because it applies "only to those foreseeable users who receive the
audited statements from the business entity for a proper business
purpose to influence a business decision of the user, the audit hav-
ing been made for that business entity;"124 and that damages would
be limited to actual losses from reliance on the misstatement.
2 5
Extending the foreseeability analysis beyond the professionalmalpactie • 126
malpractice configuration, the same court, in People Express Air-
lines v. Consolidated Rail,127 allowed a cause of action for economic
subsequently ruled that a commercial buyer could not sue in products liability for economic
losses, distinguishing Santor as a case involving an ordinary consumer. See Spring Motors
Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 670 (N.J. 1985). In reconsidering its position
on responsibility for economic losses in connection with products liability, the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted the rejection of Santor by most other state courts. See id. at 669-70.
The court's discussion in Rosenblum of the inadequacies of the widespread liability theory
are in no way dependent on the adoption of Santor and survive its reformulation in Spring
Motors.
119. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 151.
120. See id. (citing the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r).
121. Seeid. at 151.
122. See id. at 152.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 153.
125. See id. at 152. But cf. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d
536, 551 (1986) (rejecting Rosenblum).
126. Cf Rabin, Enterprise Liability, supra note 18.
127. 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985). Accord Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d
356, 360 (Alaska 1987) (adopting particular foreseeability analysis in claim for loss of in-
come and profits as a result of negligently caused loss of employee services). But see Barber
Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 56-57 (1st Cir. 1985) (declining to depart
from the no recovery rule on the grounds of precedent and policy); Louisiana ex rel. Guste
v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Dundee Cement Co. v.
Chemical Labs., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166, 1170-72 (7th Cir. 1983) (same, applying Illinois law);
Leadfree Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 711 F.2d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 1983) (same, ap-
plying Wisconsin law); FMR Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 902, 903-04 (Mass.
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loss by an airline forced to evacuate its terminal when a chemical
was negligently released from a railroad tank car located less than
a mile away. 12 8 The court was explicit about its new approach to
cases of pure economic loss:
Whatever the original common law justifications for the
physical harm rule, contemporary tort and negligence doc-
trine allow-indeed, impel-a more thorough consideration
and searching analysis of underlying policies to determine
whether a particular defendant may be liable for a plaintiff's
economic losses despite the absence of any attendant physical
harm. 129
The court was careful to require particular foreseeability:
"[D] efendant's capacity to have foreseen ... the particular plaintiff
or identifiable class of plaintiffs ... is demonstrably within the risk
created by defendant's negligence."'' 30 Thus, the airline's lost reve-
nue could be recovered on a showing that the defendants knew of
the danger presented by escaped chemicals and had in place a
plan of evacuation should an accident occur.13 ' But those inquiring
about future flights could not claim damages, for example, for lost
earnings attributable to the evacuation.12 Rosenblum and People Ex-
press look like conceptual cousins of the cases extending liability
for fright and distress.
33
1993) (same); United Textile Workers of Am. v. Lear Siegler Seating Corp., 825 S.W.2d 83,
86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (disapproving expressly People Express).
128. See People Express, 495 A.2d at 109.
129. Id. at 111.
130. Id. at 118; see also id. at 116 ("The more particular is the foreseeability that eco-
nomic loss will be suffered by the plaintiff as a result of defendant's negligence, the more
just is it that liability be imposed and recovery allowed.").
131. Seeid.atll8.
132. The New Jersey court appears sensitive to the indeterminacy of the particular
forseeability formulation: "[S] ome cases will present circumstances that defy the categoriza-
tion here devised .... In these cases, the courts will be required to draw upon notions of
fairness, common sense and morality to fix the line limiting liability as a matter of public
policy, rather than an uncritical application of the principle of particular forseeability." Id.
at 116.
133. Lord Devlin's observation in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Helter & Partners, [1964] App.
Cas. 465 (H.L.), is instructive:
The interposition of the physical injury is said to make a difference of principle. I
can find neither logic nor common sense in this.... [I] think this to be nonsense. It
is not the sort of nonsense that can arise even in the best system of law out of the
need to draw nice distinctions between borderline cases. It arises, if it is the law, sim-
ply out of a refusal to make sense.
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Similarly, in Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp.,3  a federal district
court looked at the purposes of tort law, rather than strong prece-
dent against liability for pure economic loss, to allow negligence
actions by some parties alleging financial injury from the polluting
of Chesapeake Bay. The plaintiffs included the bay's commercial
fishermen, distributors of bay produce, businesses that serviced the
bay's sportsfishing interests, and the employees of all three
groups. 3 5 In deciding which categories of plaintiffs could proceed
against Allied Chemical, Judge Mehrige candidly observed: " [T] he
set of potential plaintiffs seems almost infinite ... [S] ome limita-
tion to liability [for economic losses], even when damages are
foreseeable, is advisable.... The Court thus finds itself... without
any articulable reason for excluding any particular set of plain-
tiffs.",1 6 Nonetheless, the court proceeded to classify plaintiffs
according to familiar tort criteria. 13 Beginning with the defen-
dants' concession of commercial fishermen's right to proceed,
Judge Mehrige reasoned that sportsfishermen had as direct a
"constructive property interest in the Bay's harvestable species" as
the commercial fishermen. ' Then, in recognition of each sports-
fisherman's limited economic incentive to litigate, the court also
allowed businesses that alleged lost profits to sue as "surrogate [s]"
for the sportsfishermen. 9 With regard to the distributors of bay
produce and their employees, however, the court concluded that,
though undeniably and foreseeably injured by the alleged pollu-
tion, their claims were not cognizable because they were
Id. at 517. Hedley Byrne, the British treatment of pure economic recovery from negligent
conduct, and the "capricious" results are analyzed in Atiyah, supra note 8, at 256-65. See also
Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 38-41 (N.Y. 1985) (Meyer, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority's unexamined acceptance of Con Edison's claim of potentially
crushing liability from a mass electrical blackout).
134. 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
135. See id. at 976 n..
136. Id. at 979-80 (footnote omitted).
137. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressly declined, Judge Wisdom dis-
senting, to abandon the no recovery rule in another oil spill case, rejecting the use of
foresecability analysis. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1028-29
(5th Cir. 1985); see also Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 52-53 (1st Cir.
1985) (discussing Gustewith approval).
138. Pruitt, 523 F. Supp. at 978. The defendants' concession of liability to the commer-
cial fishermen may have been prompted by their recognition that commercial fishermen
are special "favorites of admiralty." Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 567 (9th Cir.
1974) (commercial fishermen allowed lost profits from large oil spill that killed fish). But see
Rabin, A Reassessment, supra note 8, at 1535 n.72 (dismissing Oppen as of "virtually no general
interest as a dispute over economic loss... [because it] involved the definition of property
rights in a commons, a question entirely distinct from the issues raised in most economic
loss cases").
139. See Pruitt, 523 F. Supp. at 980.
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"insufficiently direct."1 40 In essence, Judge Mehrige populates the
familiar categories of "directly" and "indirectly" harmed plaintiffs
so that infinite liability is avoided but "[d]estruction of the Bay's
wildlife ... [is not] a costless activity." 4'
These rare examples show the power of tort law's general prin-
ciples to do the work of separating compensable from
noncompensable economic losses. Unlike other recent examples
of expanded recovery, however, utilization by a few courts of con-
temporary notions of duty and causation in the context of claims
for economic loss has not stimulated other jurisdictions to fol-
low. 142 The question is why the vast majority of courts persist in the
categorical denial of recovery for pure economic loss.
143
III.
If, as I have suggested, the reasons advanced for excluding pure
economic loss from the category of recoverable injuries are largely
unpersuasive, am I able to offer another, more plausible account?
The proposition that I want to essay is this: The categorical refusal
to award damages for economic loss "only" obscures some hard
questions posed by capitalist economic arrangements, and it enjoys
ready acceptance because ideology, tradition, and perspective
combine to keep us from even imagining those questions.
As already noted, negligently inflicted pure economic losses
bear a striking similarity to losses in routine market transactions.
Recall the example of the two investors who lose millions of dol-
lars, one due to a company's poor business judgment and the
140. Id.
141. Id. at 978. The court was also concerned that the defendants pay only once for the
alleged pollution and believed that the line it drew between plaintiffs and nonplaintiffs
accomplished that purpose. Id. at 979. McThenia and Ulrich criticize the distinction be-
tween the lost economic interests of businesses and distributors dependent on an
unpolluted Chesapeake Bay, note that the precedents supported dismissal of the claims of
both categories of plaintiffs, speculate thatJudge Mehrige used the motion to dismiss to try
to force a settlement, and describe the decision to allow the surrogates to maintain a cause
of action in negligence as "imaginative." See Andrew W. McThenia & Joseph E. Ulrich, A
Return to Principles of Corrective Justice in Deciding Economic Loss Cases, 69 VA. L. RaV. 1517,
1529-34 (1983).
142. See supra note 137.
143. The refusal is even more striking in light of the limitations on liability being put
into place by legislation and insurance companies. See LoPucki, supra note 71, at 69-70.
Similarly, where socially desirable behavior is likely to cause grievous harm in the event of
an accident, legislation in selected areas seeks to balance the cost to the injured and the
injuror. See Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994) (limiting an operator's total liability
for a nuclear accident).
SPRING 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
other due to a poorly maintained utility transformer. In both in-
stances, the investors relied to their detriment on the exercise of
reasonable care by parties with superior knowledge and ability who
nonetheless made mistakes. If the investor harmed by a faulty
communications line could recover the pure economic loss, it is
difficult to explain why the investor harmed by the faulty business
decisions could not similarly claim damages. By making recovery
of economic loss in tort dependent on physical injury, the nature
of risk in the marketplace is obscured.
Softening the rough edges of capitalism by truncating inquiry is
common, often so common as to escape notice. In a challenging
article, Lynn LoPucki describes the many devices by which busi-
nesses lawfully avoid liability and the ideology that supports
them.' 44 The following is a gross simplification of just one of his
examples: In asset securitization, a company's asset-holding and
liability-generating components are separated into two free-
standing companies, in the name of maximizing earning potential
and stock value. In the event of a successful claim against the liabil-
ity-generating company, however, that company is judgment proof
and is also treated as legally unrelated to the asset-holding com-
pany. This structuring of financial relations, which LoPucki
designates the "silver bullet capable of killing liability,' ', 4 is legal,
apparently. 46 And, as LoPucki notes, "when the assets and insur-
ance of a large, publicly held company are insufficient to pay its
liabilities, most commentators still consider it the result of finan-
cial reversals rather than of strategic preparation for the possibility
of financial reversals.' 4 7 Indeed, LoPucki reminds us that corpo-
rate bankruptcy went from being a stigmatizing event in 1980 to
"'an acceptable, trendy reorganizing tool' ,,04s by the early 1990s,
and asks, "l[c] ould Americans come to see the judgment proofing
of the largest companies in the same way?"'4 9 His answer merits ex-
tended quotation:
To be culturally and politically acceptable, the process of
judgment proofing must appear to be something other than
what it is. There is every reason to believe that it will .... The
144. See LoPucki, supra note 71, at 14-38. For a colloquy on LoPucki's observations, see
James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's The Death of Liabil-
ity, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998), and Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder,
107YALEL.J. 1413 (1998).
145. LoPucki, supra note 71, at 30.
146. See id. at 24-30.
147. Id. at 53-54.
148. Id. at 44 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 53.
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public image of asset securitization is that of the invisible
hand of the market, aided by modem technology, generating
wealth by forging increasingly sophisticated financial struc-
tures. Eventually it will become obvious that the invisible
hand is not an efficient allocator of resources, because it is
moved only by the interests of contract creditors. But so long
as the companies march into this new world in tandem, each
objecting that it is forced into its course of action by competi-
tive pressures, it will be difficult for indignation to take hold.*
The problem will be seen, not entirely incorrectly, as systemic
rather than moral.
* This is essentially the formulation successfully employed by
many of the same companies during the 1980s when they
were criticized for actions that reduced their labor costs.
1 5 0
Immunizing economic loss from recovery in tort law shares the
chameleon quality LoPucki describes. The image is of noncontrac-
tual economic loss as ruinous liability threatening the financial
stability of business, industry, and insurance; this catastrophic pic-
ture, if reproduced often enough, becomes fixed, seemingly
universal, and inevitable.' Missing from this image is the reality
that the major players in this game could protect themselves from
ruinous liability through contract, that they choose instead to pre-
sent themselves as unable to do so, and that they then cite the
consequences of their choice as the reason the law should not al-
low recovery for an acknowledged injury.
In addition to ideology, another reason it is easy to ignore the
anomaly of the economic loss doctrine is the traditional division of
civil claims into those which arise from breaches of contract and
those which occur in the absence of a contract. Contract addresses
consensual economic expectations and their failure; tort focuses
on allocating the costs from noncontractual injury to persons and
property. Understandably, judges and commentators who rope off
pure economic loss from compensation routinely examine the tort
system using the touchstone of physical injury to persons and prop-
erty, even though the measure of damages depends significantly on
consequential losses, including economic ones. Indeed, as the law
150. Id. at 54 (emphasis in original).
151. After exhaustive review of the literature, Galanter finds little evidence for the sus-
tained insistence that remedying injuries to persons and property burdens the country's
economic well-being, particularly in reference to claims of an adverse effect on competi-
tiveness orjob creation. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD.
L. REv. 1093, 1145-49 (1996).
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of contract developed and as implied warranties made manufac-
turers strictly liable for losses from defective products, the
tendency to analyze negligent or tortious liability with reference to
physical harm was reinforced, lest the law of tort absorb that of
contract. 152 But the difficulty endures, because damage to property
is often nothing more (or less) than economic loss.
In a recent Supreme Court case, Saratoga Fishing Co. v. JM. Mar-
tinac & Co.," 3 a manufacturer delivered a boat to the initial
purchaser, who added equipment necessary for the vessel to en-
gage in tuna fishing.5 4 After the initial purchaser used the vessel
and the added equipment and subsequently sold the vessel includ-
ing the equipment to a second purchaser, the boat sank, allegedly
because of a defect in the hydraulic system installed by the manu-
facturer. Applying an admiralty tort doctrine that allows recovery
for injuries caused by a defective product to "other property" but
not to the defective product itself,156 Justices Breyer and Scalia de-
bated whether the added fishing equipment was part of the
"product itself' for which the second purchaser could not recover
damages in tort from the manufacturer or "other property" for
which such damages could be recovered because the defective hy-
draulic system had caused damage to the added equipment.
5 7
Thus, it is the definition of "the property," the identity of the unit
physically damaged, that becomes central. 158 Lost in the debate is
152. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 542 n.20; see also Schwartz, supra note 46, at 54-63.
153. 520 U.S. 875 (1997). The case was before the federal courts under admiralty juris-
diction; the tort law in admiralty is a judicial blend of federal and state tort law. See id. at
878.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986)
(adopting the economic loss doctrine for admiralty tort law and denying the purchaser of a
defective product recovery for pure economic losses). The East River Court further stated:
"[T]he resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the
failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core concern
of contract law." Id. at 870 (citation omitted).
157. See Saratoga Fishing, 520 U.S. at 884-85; id. at 888-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One
complicating factor in Saratoga Fishingwas the initial purchaser's use of the vessel following
his adding the equipment: Was the product the vessel without the added equipment or was
the equipment necessary before the vessel became the product? See id. at 878.
158. Justice Breyer and the majority found that the added equipment was "other prop-
erty," making the manufacturer liable to a second purchaser for that equipment. See id. at
884-85. Justice Scalia insisted that the additional equipment was an integral part of the
vessel, such that the purchaser, a commercial entity, could have recovered by warranty pro-
tection or not at all. See id. at 888-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer and the majority defend their conclusion against the claim of "too great a
potential [for] tort liability upon a manufacturer or distributor" by pointing out that "a host
of other tort principles, such as forseeability, proximate cause, and the 'economic loss' doctrine
already do, and would continue to, limit liability in important ways." Id. at 884 (emphasis
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the common-sense observation that harm to the vessel and harm to
the added equipment both involve property damage and eco-
nomic loss. Splitting the vessel and its equipment into two classes
of property, or uniting them as "the property," is simply not rele-
vant to the question of whether a regime of negligence or of
implied warranty more appropriately furthers corrective justice,
promotes safety, or assigns risks sensibly. Thus, the classic division
of contract and tort obscures the central issue of who bears the loss
and why,'5 9 while at the same time suggesting that tortious conduct
is only tangentially related to the injured party's economic well-
being.60
The habit of focusing on physical integrity so as to minimize the
inquiry about economic integrity appears in other areas of the le-
gal system. Take work-related injuries and income, for example.
Workers injured in connection with their employment suffer both
economic and physical injury. To guarantee that such workers re-
ceive compensation and to shield employers from more expensive
tort liability, the program of employer-funded workers' compensa-
tion sets a schedule of relatively automatic payments-so many
dollars for a broken wrist, so much for a sprained back. 6' Whatever
the merit of workers' compensation in delivering assured though
limited payment for work-related injuries, one consequence of
fixed schedules is a tendency to mute discussion of the economic
impact on workers ofjob-related accidents: "Yes, she's not working,
but she's got her comp." In this example, loss of income is con-
flated with recovery for a physical injury, and the cost to the wage
earner of living on less than the expected weekly income becomes
invisible. Equally problematic, the accidents themselves fade into
added). Justice Scalia, in dissent, complains that tort protection should apply "only where
contract-warranty protection is infeasible." Id. at 888 (Scalia, J., dissenting). His complaint
arises in connection with his analysis of the physical injury issue under Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A. See id. at 888-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's position seems to be that con-
tract is primary--whether for reasons of economic efficiency, autonomy, or personal
responsibility. See CANE, supra note 11, at 497-98. Logically, then, courts should analyze loss
from the perspective of those unable to protect themselves through contract or insurance.
But see supra text accompanying notes 141-43.
159. If the foundation of a building is faulty, causing a wall to collapse and also causing
significant damage to cars parked alongside the building, the "other property" doctrine
allows the car owners to sue in tort and the building owner to sue for damaged furniture,
but it denies the building owner recourse for damages to the wall. Cf Saratoga Fishing, 520
U.S. at 884-85.
160. Of course, some contractual relations are tainted by physical misconduct, like
force and duress, and are therefore void. But this is an infinitesimal part of contract juris-
prudence. For a good discussion, see HALE, supra note 20, at 109-33.
161. SeeJohn Fabian Witt, The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents
1842-1910, 107 YALE LJ. 1467, 1493-94 (1998).
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the background, relegated to a routine risk of employment. 162
Thus, harms arising from quotidian transactions in the market are
not perceived to create seriously injured parties or to generate se-
vere consequences; nor is a job-related injury, which directly
implicates economic security, seen as similar enough to injury oc-
curring away from the workplace to require complete recovery.163
This brings us to the final part of the story, the rationale itself.
Justice Cardozo's often repeated quote about the potential for in-
determinate damages focused attention on the impact on the
wrongdoer if recovery for pure economic loss were allowed, cer-
tainly a legitimate consideration. But tortious conduct injures
"innocent" persons, 64 and the impact of a legal doctrine from their
viewpoint also deserves attention. If we consider the ripple effects
of pure economic loss from the perspective of the injured, the po-
tential threat of substantial, disproportionate harm looks quite
different. To take but one example, in Stevenson, the gas company's
negligence cost the plaintiff more than a week's income, certainly
significant from his point of view. Using the Stevenson court opin-
ion as a springboard, one might argue:
Cases might well occur where a manufacturer would be
obliged to close down his factory [and the manufacturer's
employees would be obliged to spend days idle and without
income] because of the inability of [the manufacturer's] sup-
plier due to a fire loss to make prompt deliveries; the
[employees of a] power company with a contract to supply a
factory with electricity would be deprived of [their income]
which [they] would have made if the operations of the factory
had not been interrupted by reason of fire damage; a
162. Cf id. at 1497-98 (finding that workers recognized that state compensation pro-
grams deprived the community of public recognition of the employer's wrongful conduct).
Unemployment compensation, offering a percentage of wages for a limited time in the
expectation the involuntarily fired worker will find new employment, has a similar impact;
and the troubling effects of massive job losses go largely ignored. See Susan C. Faludi, The
Reckoning, WALL ST.J., May 16, 1990, at Al.
163. Consider the liability for causing a broken leg and loss of income from an auto-
mobile crash, as compared to the same broken leg caused by an accident on the job.
Indeed, one could go further, as does Richard Abel, and question both the concept of
compensatory damages as a legitimate part of relief for injury, see Richard L. Abel, A Critique
of American Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 199, 206-11 (1981), and the legitimacy of recov-
ery for economic loss under any circumstances, see Richard L. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect
Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 79, 80 (1986). Abel criticizes, in my
view correctly, the use of money as a substitute for freedom from pain or wholeness. See id.
It is ironic, of course, that conditions not measurable in money are allowable damages while
consequences like economic loss, measurable only in money, may be deemed immune
from recovery.
164. Judge Kaufman recognized this in Kinsman II. See supra note 105.
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[person] who had a contract to paint [the worker's house]
may not be able to proceed with [the] work; a [travel agent]
who would have sold [the workers vacation packages] may be
deprived of [her] commissions; the [teen-age gardener, the
grocer's delivery person, the piano teacher, and the weekly
housekeeper who service the worker's home and family] may
[each] suffer a substantial loss. The claims of wor[kers] for
loss of wages who were employed in such a factory and cannot
continue to work there because of a fire, represent only a
small fraction of the claims which would [go uncompensated]
if recovery is [denied] in this class of cases. [Not to mention
the mental distress of all affected when financial planning is
compromised.] 1
65
Thus, economic injury from tortious conduct and its ripple ef-
fects may be severe and inescapable for the innocent victim and
her peers, who rely on wages and the commerce they support. Yet
the basis for choosing a liability principle that examines the impact
on the wrongdoer and its business relations, rather than on the
injured party and her peers, is rarely addressed."
Reluctance to examine economic consequences from the per-
spective of the injured is not surprising. Market ideology tells us
that if we work hard we will have economic security. It is frighten-
ing to contemplate, instead, that economic vulnerability is only
one accident away. Even further, recovery for pure economic in-
jury would call attention to the dangers of material insecurity in an
economy that denies the ability of the market operating in the
normal course of business to cause serious financial injury. Para-
doxically, it may be easier to confront the speculative harm from
emotional distress, because it does not implicate an organizing
principle of our economy, than it is to acknowledge the proven
damages from careless but familiar behavior.
165. Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E. 200, 203-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); see su-
pra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
166. But see Louisiana ex reL Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1035-53 (5th Cir.
1985) (WisdomJ., dissenting) ("Absent hard data, I would rather err on the side of receiv-
ing little additional benefit from imposing additional quanta liability than err by adhering
to Robins'inequitable rule and bar victims' recovery on the mistaken belief that a 'marginal
incentive curve' was flat, or nearly so. If a loss must be borne, it is no worse if a 'merely'
negligent defendant bears the loss than an innocent plaintiff absorb the damages."
(quotations in original)).
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CONCLUSION
As noted earlier, this Essay is part of a project investigating the
status of physical and economic integrity in various areas of the
law. The cumulative findings from that larger project may or may
not prove a systematic and unjustified privileging of physical over
economic integrity. For now, it is enough to observe that the rule
in tort denying claims of pure economic loss is partly right and
importantly wrong. It is true that tortious conduct can cause eco-
nomic injuries with consequences as dire as those arising from
physical harms. Liability of indeterminate magnitude is, therefore,
an appropriate concern in designing an injury compensation
scheme. To conclude that all such claims must be denied is faulty,
however, for as we have seen, the difference between damage to
property and economic loss is frequently incoherent; causation
and duty are capable of doing the job of containing liability by
separating recoverable from unrecoverable losses; the wrongdoer
may be in a better position to avoid the hazard and spread the risk,
with insurance playing its customary role; and the fact that eco-
nomic injury may be severe and inescapable does not tell us which
party should bear that injury. Further, and here is the important
wrongness, the categorical denial of the right to recover for pure
economic injury does positive injustice to our understanding of
the significance of material insecurity and economic integrity in
American society.16 Instead of clarifying the question of who bears
the costs of potentially harmful but nonetheless desirable activity,
the categorical no recovery rule obscures the logically antecedent
question of which harms count. A rule which recognized pure
economic loss from negligent conduct as compensable injury
would illuminate this question by focusing attention on the signifi-
cance of our economic well-being and its fragility.
Older readers may recall the Jack Benny routine in which the
comedian hesitates when faced with the demand, "Your money or
your life!" After an exaggerated pause, the holdup man demands,
"Well?," to which Benny replies, "I'm thinking, I'm thinking!" The
gag worked because, in taking the rhetorical question as offering a
choice, Benny reinforced his well-established reputation as a
cheapskate; only the tightest of fists could consider money more
important than life. The consequences of denying recovery for
167. Again, this Essay seeks to explain the anomalous treatment of pure economic loss
in tort, not to argue that the treatment has created problems crying out for solution or that
any particular reform is best.
[VOL. 32:3
SPRING 1999] On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss 439
economic loss are less dire than for resisting an armed robber, but
oddly the presupposition is the same: Life, physical integrity, is al-
ways to be preferred over wealth, economic integrity. If this essay
succeeds, it is because readers are prompted to speculate about
other circumstances in which to merely ask a question such as
"your money or your life?" is not to answer it.

